Keynote Speakers
Accurate and reliable identification of human individuals is critical and cannot be understated in increasingly interconnected society. As traditional identification such as passwords cannot deliver the required accuracy and reliability, biometric identification (or simply biometrics) has emerged as the promising alternative. This talk will review the latest progress in biometrics and discuss on some promising research directions for the next generation biometrics. I will also discuss on our recent work for the iris, face and gait recognition with some interesting demos, such as for mobile iris recognition, iris recognition at a distance, generative adversarial networks based face image super-resolution and photorealistic face rotation, cross-view gait recognition, etc.
Tieniu Tan received MSc and PhD degrees in electronic engineering from Imperial College London, U.K and received BSc degree in electronic engineering from Xi'an Jiaotong University, China. He returned to China in 1998 and joined the National Laboratory of Pattern Recognition (NLPR), Institute of Automation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Beijing, China, where he is currently a Professor and the director of Center for Research on Intelligent Perception and Computing (CRIPAC), and was former director (1998-2013) of the NLPR and Director General of the Institute (2000-2007). He is currently also Deputy Director of Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong S.A.R. He has published 14 edited books or monographs and more than 600 research papers in refereed international journals and conferences in the areas of image processing, computer vision and pattern recognition. His current research interests include biometrics and information content security.
Most research modelling Bitcoin-style decentralised consensus protocols has assumed profit-motivated participants. This talk will revisit the notion of attackers with an extrinsic motivation to disrupt the consensus process (Goldfinger attacks). Attackers have several options for obtaining a majority of decision-making power in the consensus protocol (a hostile takeover). Our analysis suggests several fundamental differences between proof-of-work and proof-of-stake systems in the face of such an adversary.
Joseph Bonneau received a PhD from the University of Cambridge and an BS/MS from Stanford. He has previously worked at Princeton and at Google, Yahoo, and Cryptography Research Inc. More details on his research and publications are accessible from http://jbonneau.com/
